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ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVEt
Samuel P. Hays*
During the past several decades, litigation has played a major
role in the attempt by citizens to realize environmental objec-
tives. Its impact has been elaborated extensively in the vast ar-
ray of writing in law journals as well as in the cases themselves.
Most analyses have focused on specialized subjects of either sub-
stantive policy or legal procedure. In this brief Essay I attempt a
more comprehensive overview involving two background fac-
tors-the growth of environmental values since World War II
and the response of governmental institutions to the resulting
demands placed upon them. Among these institutions were the
courts. Their role cannot be understood simply in terms of the
evolution of judicial opinion, but more in terms of the response
of judges and the legal profession to changing public atti-
tudes, legislative policies, scientific knowledge, and technical
capabilities.'
As environmental action accelerated in the 1960's, many citi-
zens found the courts to be a possible avenue for action. If some
felt that the activities of others were subjecting them to environ-
mental harm, they might seek redress through a lawsuit. For
centuries courts had been available to any citizen who felt that
another was causing harm. Judges had supervised such "im-
pacts" in innumerable instances, sorting out effects of a wide
range of daily human activities that were prohibited from those
that were accepted. The identity of these prohibited acts
changed over the years. Damage to one's person or property was
clearly to be restrained. Then damage to one's health came to be
an acceptable cause of action. Damage to one's enjoyment of life
t This Essay will appear in substantially the same form in The Politics of Litigation,
in BEAUTY, HEALTH AND PERMANENCE: ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES,
1955-1985 (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
* Professor of History, University of Pittsburgh. B.A., 1948, Swarthmore College;
M.A., 1949, Ph.D., 1953, Harvard University.
1. For a more extensive account of this Essay's topic, see Hays, Three Decades of
Environmental Politics: The Historical Context, in THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN ENVI-
RONMENTAL POLITICS (M. Lacey ed.) (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,
forthcoming).
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through a nuisance caused by another became another cause of
action. A body of common law had evolved out of these day-to-
day claims and counterclaims that served as precedent for citi-
zen demands that the courts provide aid to protect them against
environmental harm.2
To these overtures courts responded positively, not all in the
same way or with the same choices, but most accepting the no-
tion that in environmental affairs some new infringement of per-
sonal liberties and rights was involved and that this could lead
to justifiable restraints. New circumstances and new social val-
ues led to the infusion of traditional doctrines with new
substance.
The first well-publicized case invoking these new social values
involved a citizen protest to a proposal by Consolidated Edison,
a utility company in New York State that sought to build a
pumped-storage facility for generating electric power on the
Hudson River. The project would have had a number of adverse
effects, including aesthetic degradation in the river valley. The
point at issue was one of the most difficult and yet most signifi-
cant that could have been raised-harm to aesthetic environ-
mental values rather than to person or property. Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission, more
popularly known as the Storm King case, helped to halt the
project for many years and in 1980 led to a negotiated out-of-
court settlement in which the proposal was abandoned.3 This
case is often considered the beginning point of environmental
law.4 It had an exhilarating effect on both lawyers and environ-
mentalists as to the possible role of law and the courts in achiev-
ing environmental objectives.
2. The common law of nuisance as a source of legal action on behalf of environmental
objectives is explored in Bryson & Macbeth, Public Nuisance, the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, and Environmental Law, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 241 (1972). For an example of the
evolution of nuisance common law into environmental protection statutory law, see Cub-
bage & Siegel, The Law Regulating Private Forest Practices, 83 J. FORESTRY 538 (1985).
3. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). For a discussion of
the Storm King case, see A. TALBOT, POWER ALONG THE HUDSON: THE STORM KING CASE
AND THE BIRTH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM (1972). For a report on the settlement, see N.Y.
Times, Dec. 20, 1980, at 24L, col. 1. The case can be followed in detail in Scenic Hudson
News, published from 1971 to 1980 by Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference in New
York, N.Y. and from 1980 on by Scenic Hudson, Inc., Poughkeepsie, N.Y.
4. A review of the early history of environmental law is contained in the proceedings
of the conference that led to the organization of the Environmental Law Institute (ELI),
LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1970). The conference, held in Warrenton, Va., Sept. 11-12,
1969, was sponsored jointly by the Conservation Foundation and the Conservation and
Research Foundation.
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Environmental litigation grew rapidly in the 1960's and 1970's
as reflected in the evolution of an environmental specialization
within law, new environmental law journals, new case reporting
publications, and specialized training in law schools.5 From the
larger historical view, however, we must not overlook the need to
root these changes in the evolving values of the American peo-
ple, to which the legal system responded and which often re-
vealed themselves in far less dramatic ways. The judicial re-
sponse to these new values represented the larger and oft-
repeated process by which legal institutions found ways of incor-
porating new substantive issues into methods of dispute
resolution.
In the 1970's, litigation came to be an important realm of en-
vironmental decisionmaking. Citizens brought lawsuits to pro-
tect themselves from environmental harm. Citizen litigation or-
ganizations were formed to tackle problems of law involving not
only issues of individual protection, but national environmental
issues as well. Two of these organizations were the environmen-
tal Defense Fund (EDF) and the Natural Resources Defense
Council (NRDC). The Sierra Club established its own Legal De-
fense Fund and the National Wildlife Federation added lawyers
to its staff. Other organizations took legal action by joining with
one of these groups, often in combination to pool resources, or
by hiring their own attorneys. This litigation received considera-
ble publicity and served to sharpen environmental issues for the
public as well as to resolve disputes for the participants.6
5. The earliest specialized law journals were ENvTL. L. (1970- , Northwestern School
of Law, Lewis and Clark College, Portland, Or.); ECOLOGY L.Q. (1971- , University of
California, Berkeley); and ENVTL. AFF. (1971- , Boston College Environmental Law
Center). Journals established later were COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. (1974- , Columbia Univer-
sity); HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (1976- , Harvard University); STAN. ENVTL. L. ANN. (1978- ,
Stanford University); and PUe. LAND L. REV. (1980- , University of Montana). An older
journal in the natural resource field is LAND & WATER L. REV. (1966- , University of
Wyoming). The major reporting and review service in environmental law is ELI, ENVTL.
L. REP. (1970- , Washington, D.C.). For information about its formation, see CONSERVA-
TION FOUND. LETrER, Sept. 30, 1969. For a useful survey of its work, see ELI, THE FIRST
DECADE (1980). The standard case reporting service for federal court decisions is Bureau
of Nat'l Affairs, ENVTL. L. REP.-CASES (1970- ). A bibliography of environmental law
articles is contained each month in ENvTL. L. REP. For the early development of the
environmental curriculum in law schools, see Tarlock, Current Trends in the Develop-
ment of an Environmental Curriculum, in LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 4, at
297.
6. An early review of environmental litigation is J. MACDONALD & J. CONWAY, ENVI-
RONMENTAL LITIGATION (1972). A running account of environmental litigation activities is
contained in the publications of the various environmental groups. See EDF LETTER
(1970- ); NRDC NEWSLETTER (1971- ). A useful compilation of litigation pursued by one
organization is NRDC, INC., DoCKEr, SUMMARY OF LITIGATION, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEED-
INGS, AND OTHER MATTERS RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH
SUMMER 1986]
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Use of the courts for these purposes was facilitated by provi-
sions in environmental statutes providing that citizens could
bring suit against administrators who failed to enforce the law.
Laws such as the Clean Air Act 7 and the Clean Water Act" were
the first to contain citizen suit provisions, but these provisions
came to be typical elements in all the environmental legislation
of the 1970's. Authorized citizen suits were usually confined to
those cases in which the administrator was required to enforce a
nondiscretionary duty under the statutory language of "must"
rather than a discretionary duty under the language of "may." A
less successful venture was the proposal to enact a general citi-
zen suit law that would provide statutory authorization for citi-
zens generally to bring lawsuits to protect their environmental
rights. The Michigan Environmental Protection Act" was a gen-
eral citizen suit law enacted in Michigan in 1970 under the lead-
ership of Professor Joseph Sax of the University of Michigan
Law School.10 Citizen suit provisions were intended to extend
THE NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. HAS TAKEN AN ACTIVE ROLE (1977). For
early Sierra Club litigation, see its NAT'L NEWS REP., Feb. 20, 1970. A brief overview of
National Wildlife Federation litigation is NWF Winning Battles on the Legal Front,
NAT'L WILDLIFE, Apr.-May 1984, at 30. A useful account of the broader media and public
role of litigation with respect to a DDT proceeding in Wisconsin pursued by the EDF is
in T. DUNLAP, DDT: SCIENTISTS, CITIZENS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1981). For a general state-
ment of the potential role of citizens in environmental litigation, see J. SAX, DEFENDING
THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION (1971). See also Roberts, The Right
to a Decent Environment: Progress Along a Constitutional Avenue, in LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 4, at 134; Berlin, Kessler & Roisman, Law in Action: The
Trust Doctrine, in LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 4, at 166. These articles out-
line the use of both the ninth amendment to the Constitution and the trust doctrine as
possibilities for environmental action through the courts. For the public trust doctrine,
see also THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND MANAGEMENT (H.
Dunning ed. 1981).
7. Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982)).
8. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended
at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)).
9. Environmental Protection Act of 1970, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 691.1201-.1207
(1979).
10. For accounts of the results of the Michigan statute, see Sax & DiMento, Environ-
mental Citizen Suits: Three Years' Experience Under the Michigan Environmental
Protection Act, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1974); Slone, The Michigan Environmental Protec-
tion Act: Bringing Citizen-Initiated Environmental Suits into the 1980's, 12 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 271 (1985).
An unsuccessful attempt was made to enact a federal general citizen suit law. See
Comment, Standing on the Side of the Environment: A Statutory Prescription for Citi-
zen Participation, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 561 (1971); see also Hearings on S. 3575 Before the
Subcomm. on Energy, Natural Resources and the Environment of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
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the possibilities of citizen environmental action beyond what
had already taken place."
The amount of environmental litigation arising from citizen
complaints was relatively limited. It had a far greater media im-
pact than would be suggested by the number of lawsuits. In the
two years of 1979 and 1980, only nineteen actions were brought
under the citizen suit provisions of all the federal environmental
laws, and of these, twelve were brought by citizen groups them-
selves." The Michigan Environmental Protection Act led to only
185 lawsuits in the first thirteen years of its existence, an aver-
age of only fourteen each year. ' While opponents of environ-
mental litigation often complained about the degree to which
such action was "clogging the courts" and argued against further
citizen suit legislation on the grounds that it would overburden
the legal system, only a small amount of citizen-inspired envi-
ronmental litigation actually took place. Therefore, although liti-
gation extended the possibilities of environmental action and
several cases played a significant role in the evolution of federal
policy, the total number of environmental cases litigated was
small compared with other types of litigation, such as private
contract disputes.14
The 1969 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)1 5 gave
rise to a great number of environmental lawsuits, and the federal
11. An account of action under the citizen suit provisions of various federal environ-
mental laws between 1978 and 1984 is ELI, CITIZEN SUITS: AN ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN EN-
FORCEMENT ACTIONS UNDER EPA-ADMINISTERED STATUTES (1984). See also Cramton &
Boyer, Citizen Suits in the Environmental Field: Peril or Promise?, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 407
(1972); Fadil, Citizen Suits Against Polluters: Picking Up the Pace, 9 HARV. ENVm. L.
REV. 23 (1985); Licata & Licata, Citizen Suits-Help or Hindrance in the Enforcement
of Environmental Statutes?, ENVTL. F., Mar. 1985, at 20. Controversy over statutory pro-
visions for citizen suits arose again over potential action under the Superfund renewal in
1985. See Ketcham-Colwill, Congress Debates Allowing Citizen Suits Under Superfund
Law, ENVTL. & ENERGY STUDY CONF. FACT SHEET (Aug. 19, 1985). For a brief biography of
a long-time citizen suit lawyer, see Profile, Citizen Suit Activist Tony Roisman, ENV'rL.
F., Dec. 1984, at 19.
12. Sandier, Citizen Suit Litigation, ENVIRONMENT, Mar. 1981, at 38, 38-39.
13. Slone, supra note 10, at 273.
14. For a general view of litigation in American society, see J. LIEBERMAN, THE LITI-
GIOUS SOCIETY (1981). Lieberman cites to the 1980 edition of the Annual Report of the
Director, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts regarding the number of different
classes of litigation in the federal courts. Of 168,789 civil suits in 1980, the largest cate-
gory, 49,000, involved private contract disputes. Environmental cases were so small in
number that they were not mentioned. J. LIEBERMAN, supra, at 5. A review of the federal
district court load conducted in 1978 concluded that "the number of environmental suits
filed in the district courts is a small fraction of the total caseload." Demkovich, The
Clogged Federal Courts- Who Are the Culprits?, 10 NAT'L J. 222, 226 (1978).
15. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4370a (1982 & Supp. 11 1984)).
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courts supervised its implementation. The courts, however, con-
fined their role to its procedural requirements and declined to
plunge into the substantive issues. The courts argued that the
law required agencies to make an interdisciplinary analysis of all
relevant environmental factors, including possible alternative ac-
tions that would reduce adverse environmental impacts, and
struck down administrative actions that constituted a more su-
perficial response to NEPA. As a result, environmentalists found
an opportunity to ensure that environmental values were
seriously considered, even if not accepted, in administrative
decisions.16
This court action should be viewed not as a product of NEPA,
but as an evolution of a more longstanding court practice of su-
pervising administrative procedure. Agencies should not make
decisions on the basis of narrow or limited considerations of in-
terest to one party alone, because to do so would be arbitrary
and capricious. Moreover, agencies should make decisions openly
and on the record so that anyone who wished to review
them-Congress, the President, or the courts, as well as citi-
zens-could understand fully their bases. Court supervision of
NEPA grew more out of the elaboration of fair administrative
procedures than out of the statute itself. 7
16. For a discussion of NEPA litigation, see F. ANDERSON, NEPA AND THE COURTS
(1973); R. LIROFF, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: NEPA AND ITS AFTERMATH
(1976); L. WENNER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE IN COURT (1982).
17. In Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.
1970), the Second Circuit held that citizens could have standing to question the decisions
of an administrative agency under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§
551-559, 701-706 (1982), independent of statutory provisions, and that hence the APA
gave the federal courts jurisdiction over agency actions. Decisions under NEPA were
closely intertwined with decisions under the APA and it seems plausible to argue that it
was the latter that gave considerable, even crucial, force and shape to the former.
On a number of occasions the court outlined its general approach to requiring open
procedures. See, e.g., EDF v. Blum, 458 F. Supp. 650 (D.D.C. 1978). In Blum, the EPA,
in developing regulations pertaining to the use of Ferriamicide to control fire ants in
Mississippi, did not make an open record. The court complained:
The agency's technical expertise is normally given prevailing weight, because the
procedures prescribed by the APA create a sense of confidence in the result by
reason of the fact that they ensure interested parties a full opportunity to make
submissions and respond to comments already made. Such confidence, however,
cannot result if this full opportunity is denied, as where pertinent communica-
tions are received in secret by the agency.
Id. at 659. The court expanded its view further:
[E]ven if the detailed contents of ... ex parte contacts were revealed by the
agency on judicial review, we would still be deprived of the benefit of an adver-
sarial discussion among the parties. Our cases ... make clear the critical role of
adversarial comment in ensuring proper functioning of agency decisionmaking
and effective judicial review. Such comment serves not only to clarify the issues
and positions being considered at the agency level, but also to ensure that fac-
Environmental Litigation
Courts appealed to citizen groups partially because their basis
for action lay not in numbers of people who demanded this or
that, or in mobilization of opinion by means of lobbyists that
might require extensive financial resources, but in the facts of
argument. It might have been feasible for a legislator to count
the letters or personal phone calls or for an administrator to be
impressed with the four-foot stack of documents submitted by
corporations in rulemaking, and then to bend in the direction of
that political weight. Courts, however, relied more on logical ar-
gument and its supporting facts. They sought to narrow a point
at issue precisely and then to weigh the evidence submitted.
Although some cases could generate large amounts of evi-
dence, often it was the compilation of crucial facts and selected
argument about their meaning that made the difference. Hence,
one often could have some influence in the courts by keeping
fully abreast of new scientific research, bringing friendly experts
to the witness stand, and presenting a carefully reasoned analy-
sis. Early in the 1970's, a number of young law school graduates
found considerable excitement in such an opportunity. Much of
the challenge was to determine precisely how to secure leverage
to influence administrative agencies. Especially significant was
the attempt to link legal skills with the scientific and economic
expertise that was the hallmark of environmental litigation orga-
nizations. At times those organizations coaxed scientists out of
the laboratory and into administrative and judicial proceedings.
At other times they were able to employ scientists of high repute
on their own staffs. Citizen environmental legal action placed a
premium on mobilizing expertise within the context of legal
institutions.1 8
tual questions underlying the agency's decision are not raised, by necessity, for
the first time on judicial review. And adversarial comment is particularly critical
where ... ex parte communications are made by a party interested in securing
[favorable agency action].
Id. at 659-60 (alterations in original) (quoting United States Lines v. Federal Maritime
Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
18. A case in which environmental litigation, by the NRDC, drew researchers from
the laboratory into administrative proceedings involved the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) actions in drawing up a criteria document and an ambient standard for
lead. See Schoenbrod, Why Regulation of Lead Has Failed, in Low LEVEL LEAD EXPO-
SURE: THE CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT RESEARCH 259-66 (H. Needleman ed.
1980). Schoenbrod, the NRDC attorney in the case, persuaded two lead researchers to
draft their own document for consideration by the EPA Science Advisory Board. H.
NEEDLEMAN & S. PIOMELLI, THE EFFECTS OF Low LEVEL LEAD EXPOSURE (1978).
In the early 1980's, the EDF appointed to its staff two scientists of considerable stand-
ing in their professions, Ellen Silbergeld, a toxicologist, and Michael Oppenheimer, an
atmospheric physicist. Both had made significant contributions to scientific research,
and Oppenheimer continued to do so as a member of the EDF staff. See, e.g., Oppen-
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Litigation, however, was not inexpensive, and the resources
available to citizen environmentalists were meager in contrast
with those available to industry. The cost of bringing a lawsuit
was great enough to make it less than likely that citizen suit pro-
visions or general citizen suit statutes would lead to much legal
action. The expense of expert witnesses and lawyers made legal
action prohibitive to most citizens, and the ability to undertake
it often depended upon citizens' ability to command volunteer
or pro bono services from lawyers and technical experts. The
cost of even such an elementary item as the transcript of court
proceedings was often far too great for a citizen environmental
plaintiff.
Although environmentalists were often able to pursue action
more successfully in the courts than in either legislation or ad-
ministration, they could not do so on a massive scale. Selective
action was the rule. The relative ability of industry to bring liti-
gation, challenge administrators through lawsuits, and postpone
action and neutralize administrative choice, in contrast with the
limited capabilities of environmentalists, was striking. Often, in
fact, innovations that opened the courts to citizen environmen-
talists led to their being used more frequently by government
agencies and even industry. Litigation demonstrated the politi-
cal inequality between the contending parties as fully as did leg-
islation and administrative actions.19
To these demands for decisions with respect to environmental
issues, the courts made several responses that reflected their ac-
ceptance of changes in American society that environmental
objectives represented. One of these concerned the question of
standing, which is the right of a person to bring an issue to the
court for resolution. Traditionally, the courts had been inclined
to accept claims of harm to one's person or property as the ma-
jor cause for action or complaint. If one could demonstrate the
fact or the likelihood of adverse effects or injuries of those kinds,
heimer, Epstein & Yuhnke, Acid Deposition, Smelter Emissions, and the Linearity Is-
sue in the Western United States, 229 SCIENCE 859 (1985).
The NRDC and EDF reached a high level of credibility in the nation's capital. A study
reported in early 1985, in which Washington policymakers rated 41 organizations repre-
senting both environmental and industry groups concerned with environmental policy
for their "effectiveness, influence [and] credibility," placed the NRDC first and the EDF
fourth among the entire 41; the first six in ranking were environmental groups. Ward &
Floyd, Washington Lobbying Groups. . . How They Rate, ENVTL. F., Apr. 1985, at 9, 12.
19. Of the 19 federal cases reported by Sandler, supra note 12, four were brought by
industries and three by state and local governments. Most of the litigation under Michi-
gan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970, MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 691.1201-.1207 (1979),
was brought by plaintiffs other than environmentalists, among whom local and state gov-
ernment agencies were the largest in number. See Sax & DiMento, supra note 10.
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then one had grounds for using the courts or, as it was said, had
standing. Often, environmentalists' opponents argued that a
complaint should be dismissed because the environmentalists
lacked standing.2 °
Environmentalists argued that they had environmental rights,
as well as rights to property ownership and freedom from physi-
cal harm, which legal action could protect. To them, the most
significant decision on this issue was Sierra Club v. Morton,2 a
case in which environmentalists objected to a permit application
by Disney Enterprises to construct a large ski resort in the Min-
eral King Canyon in California. The Supreme Court affirmed
that the defense of aesthetic rights on the part of those who
used the area for outdoor enjoyment was a legitimate cause of
action. After Morton, courts accepted standing to defend envi-
ronmental values, and even aesthetic rights, if those threatened
sought redress.22
The significance of this innovation was not merely legal. It in-
volved acceptance by the Supreme Court of a major fact of life
to which the social changes since World War II had given rise.
People valued the quality of the environment around them; they
engaged in recreational pursuits in such areas. These values be-
came central in people's daily lives and in public institutions'
ongoing concerns. These changes led to new views as to what
20. For a review of the evolution of standing, see Jaffe, Standing to Sue in Conserva-
tion Suits, in LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 4, at 123. See also Comment, Con-
servationists' Standing to Challenge the Actions of Federal Agencies, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q.
305 (1971).
21. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
22. See Comment, Mineral King: A Case Study in Forest Service Decision Making, 2
ECOLOGY L.Q. 493 (1972). Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power
Commission, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966), however,
came earlier. In it the court reasoned:
In order to insure that the Federal Power Commission will adequately protect
the public interest in the aesthetic, conservational, and recreational aspects of
power development, those who by their activities and conduct have exhibited a
special interest in such areas, must be held to be ... aggrieved parties .... We
hold that the Federal Power Act gives petitioners a legal right to protect their
special interests.
Id. at 616.
Equally significant was a subsequent case that reviewed an interstate highway location
decision of the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads and involved no economic loss to conserva-
tionists. The judge held that even without a statutory provision for judicial review, ad-
ministrative provisions calling for environmental consideration were sufficient to show a
"congressional intent" that civic and conservation groups be considered "aggrieved." See
Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Louis L. Jaffe, of
Harvard Law School, commented on this case: "The decision thus opens up to judicial
review at the instance of representative persons any official action alleged to have ig-
nored or violated statutory standards governing the action." CONSERVATION FOUND. LET-
TER, Sept. 30, 1969, at 4.
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constituted harm to the individual, and to the reassessment of
the effects of developmental actions that earlier had been taken
for granted as necessary consequences of economic growth. Aes-
thetic harm could now be set alongside harm to one's person,
health, and property as values of serious personal and social
consequence.Y'
This thinking by the Court was relatively easy to maintain be-
cause it was closely related to the longstanding notion in nui-
sance cases that individuals should be free to enjoy daily life
without unwarranted intrusion. It was often difficult, however,
to determine where to draw the line between the freedom of
others to intrude and the freedom of the individual from such
intrusion. But the notion of environmental intrusion as a poten-
tial adverse effect on individual rights simply elaborated, in light
of changing social values, more traditional ways in which the
Court had responded to similar kinds of claims.2"'
The courts also accepted an enlargement in state police power
on behalf of environmental objectives. This referred to the au-
thority that had long existed in state constitutions of power to
protect the health, safety, and morals of citizens. This general
supervisory power could change with time and did, depending
upon social change itself. As change produced new problems and
new demands upon government, it could be argued that a new
exercise of traditional authority was required.
At one time, for example, the courts had argued that states
could not regulate wages and hours of work or the conditions of
work. But as public views about this changed so did those of the
courts, and they accepted such supervisory powers as constitu-
tionally legitimate. In the 1950's and 1960's such authority was
extended to civil rights. When storekeepers claimed a right to
exclude blacks as customers on the grounds that they had a
right to use their property as they wished, the courts argued that
there were other rights as well, and that the state could legiti-
mately use its police power to restrain one in order to protect
the other. The police power of states had evolved gradually over
the years as society and the economy had evolved, and the im-
pact of the actions of one person upon another, as well as the
23. A judicial recognition of the evolution of the importance of aesthetic values in the
United States is contained in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 510
(1981) (taking note of the increasing number of states and municipalities regulating bill-
boards to prevent aesthetic harm).
24. See, e.g., Note, Aesthetic Nuisance: An Emerging Cause of Action, 45 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1075 (1970).
[VOL. 19:4
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impact of institutions upon individuals, had become more com-
plex and intricate.
Environmental issues had implications for the states' police
power because citizens often called upon government to advance
environmental objectives or to regulate to prevent environmen-
tal harm. General laws extended this protection from common
law court action to general supervisory action by governmental
agencies. Police power to protect health was long established
and was the most readily accepted source of governmental au-
thority to address the new environmental concerns; similar
power to protect amenities was less readily acknowledged. Yet
courts now affirmed the right of a state to protect community
aesthetic and amenity values. Laws called for restrictions on the
use of land to avoid adverse effects on others. The courts argued
that these were also a legitimate use of state authority. States
felt that they should go further than the protection of health
and property to the protection of values associated with the en-
joyment of life.
In the late 1960's, several states amended their constitutions
by affirming the "environmental rights" of their citizens. Envi-
ronmental rights included the right to an enjoyable natural envi-
ronment as well as to a clean one. Such amendments reflected
the widespread affirmation of environmental values as broadly
shared social values. But when citizens in Pennsylvania sought
to bring lawsuits on the grounds that actions of individuals, cor-
porations, or governmental agencies deprived them of environ-
mental rights, courts often held back. Courts argued that the
constitutional right was not self-enforcing and remained a mere
general affirmation until turned into a specific statute. Failing to
secure judicial recognition of substantive environmental guaran-
tees in another Pennsylvania case, environmentalists sought to
persuade the court that the state constitutional provision im-
plied procedural safeguards such as environmental impact analy-
sis. But this effort was rejected as well.25
25. New York and Michigan adopted amendments in the form of statements of pol-
icy, but Massachusetts and Pennsylvania affirmed citizen environmental rights. For a
discussion of the Pennsylvania amendment, see Broughton, The Proposed Pennsylvania
Declaration of Environmental Rights, Analysis of HB 958, 41 PENN. B.A.Q. 421 (1970);
Loutz, An Analysis of Pennsylvania's New Environmental Rights Amendment and the
Gettysburg Tower Case, 78 DICK. L. REV. 331 (1973); Pearson & Hutton, Land Use in
Pennsylvania: Any Change Since the Environmental Rights Amendment?, 14 DuQ. L.
REV. 165 (1976).
A federal amendment was proposed as a House Joint Resolution in 1969 by Rep. Ot-
tinger and 10 colleagues. It declared that the "right of the people to clean air, pure
water, freedom from excessive and unnecessary noise, and the natural, scenic, historical
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Courts' acceptance of the role of environmental values in is-
sues about both standing and police power did not mean, how-
ever, that environmental rights would invariably prevail. Despite
these affirmations of basic principles, courts retained considera-
ble discretion in drawing the line between one right and another,
in balancing, for example, property rights and environmental
rights. If two such rights were in contention, the courts might
well argue that although a state could, in principle, constitution-
ally use its power and authority to carry out environmental pur-
poses, in specific cases action might go too far in restraining the
rights of others, such as property owners, who might be affected.
Hence, litigation often appeared to be a game in which courts
drew fine lines between competing claims, veering one way and
then another, thereby retaining considerable power of decision
in the courts.26
In responding to changing social values, courts often sought to
grapple with fundamental aspects of modern society and the
problems they generated that environmentalists brought to the
fore. Courts often focused on those problems more precisely and
effectively than did either legislatures or administrative agen-
cies. Courts had a way of sorting the wheat from the chaff in an
issue, focusing on the crucial point of a dispute and pushing to
the side those aspects of argument that were derivative and ma-
nipulative, so the nub of the controversy could be laid bare. In
and esthetic qualities of their environment shall not be abridged." CONSERVATION REP.,
Feb. 21, 1969, at 96. NEPA, when first passed by the Senate, contained language that
"each person has a fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful environment." CONP.
REP. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2767, 2768. That language was altered to "each person should enjoy a healthful environ-
ment," id., because of fears that it would open the way to a flood of lawsuits by people
claiming that their environment was not healthful. Senator Jackson, cosponsor of the
Act, said that he would introduce an amendment to the new law proposing a detailed
congressional declaration of a statutory bill of environmental rights. Congress, however,
did not restore the original language. See CONSERVATION FOUND. LrrTER, Apr. 1970, at 3.
26. Much legal analysis in this vein concerned land use regulation and the taking
issue, in which environmental considerations led to the practice of courts balancing pri-
vate property rights with public environmental objectives and, hence, not following the
practice of requiring that owners be compensated for the full diminution of value of their
property under regulatory restrictions. For innovations of this kind, see Binder, Taking
Versus Reasonable Regulation: A Reappraisal in Light of Regional Planning and Wet-
lands, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1972). See also Pearson & Hutton, supra note 25; Cubbage &
Siegel, supra note 2. A major relevant court case was Just v. Marinette County, 56
Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972), in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that the
use of private property could be restricted without compensation if it prevented public
harm. For a discussion of the case, see Bryden, A Phantom Doctrine: The Origins and
Effects of Just v. Marinette County, 3 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 397 (1978). A summary
of this kind of balancing is in THE USE OF LAND: A CITIZENS' POLICY GUIDE TO URBAN
GROWTH 145 (W. Reilly ed. 1973).
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doing so, courts often focused on the crux of broad social contro-
versy as well as on the issues immediately before them.
Three such types of controversies were present in environmen-
tal affairs, each one involving issues arising from three major in-
novations in post-World War II society: new knowledge, new
values, and new technologies. Judicial reasoning and argument
that lay behind judicial decision on these issues made clear the
larger meaning of environmental change.
Environmental issues and the environmentalists who pressed
them placed considerable emphasis on the frontiers of scientific
knowledge and helped to shape a continuing set of controversies
among scientists about the nature of scientific knowledge and
proof. Opinion ranged on a scale from those who demanded very
high levels of proof of environmental harm before conclusions
could be drawn, to those who kept an eye on the frontiers of
knowledge and were willing to draw that evidence into their as-
sessments of what the facts meant. They emphasized the need to
make reasonable judgments about harm rather than to affirm
conclusive knowledge. Amid these controversies, whose view
would prevail? In case after case the courts faced this issue of
disagreement. Scientists themselves could not generate a consen-
sus of opinion. Hence, their own disagreements were thrown
onto political institutions for decision and ultimately onto the
courts.
17
For the most part, courts did not wish to take part in the sub-
stance of these disputes; they did not have sufficient technical
27. Major cases in which the court outlined its approach to the assessment of health
effects were Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir.) (lead), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1042 (1980); EDF v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (polychlorinated biphynels);
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976);
Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (effects of asbestos fibers in
drinking water); EDF v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (aldrin/dieldrin); Society of
the Plastics Indus. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975) (vinyl chloride); Industrial
Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (occupational asbestos
exposure); NRDC v. Train, 396 F. Supp. 1386 (D.D.C. 1975) (chlorodane and
heptachlor).
In Lead Industries Association, the lead industry argued that "Congress only author-
ized the [EPA] Administrator to set primary air quality standards that are aimed at
protecting the public against health effects which are known to be clearly harmful." 647
F.2d at 1148 (emphasis in original). But Chief Judge J. Skelly Wright, writing for the
majority, said that Congress "specifically directed the Administrator to allow an ade-
quate margin of safety in setting primary air quality standards in order to provide some
protection against effects that research has not yet uncovered." Id. at 1153.
Similarly, in Ethyl Corp., the court noted:
The administrator may... draw conclusions from suspected, but not completely
substantiated, relationships between facts, from trends among facts, from theo-
retical projections from imperfect data, from probative preliminary data not yet
certifiable as "fact," and the like. We believe that a conclusion so drawn-a risk
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training. They were willing, though, to make judgments about
whether or not the assessment of evidence by other governmen-
tal bodies, such as administrative agencies, reached a reasonable
conclusion and hence was an acceptable alternative among possi-
ble choices. It was not enough for a plaintiff to argue that there
was scientific disagreement on the issue, and that the court
should not choose among claimants. This strategy often stopped
legislators and administrators in their tracks, but courts dis-
missed that response. Courts were established to act, to make
choices, albeit difficult ones, and not to temporize. And in mak-
ing this kind of choice they were quite willing to say that a con-
clusion based on frontier knowledge constituted sound judg-
ment. Although they did reject some cases of such reasoning as
not conclusive, they tended to affirm the environmental argu-
ment that emerging knowledge could constitute a basis for judg-
ment in contrast with the plea for conclusive knowledge that
many brought to proceedings.2"
assessment-may, if rational, form the basis for health-related regulations under
the "will endanger" language of Section 211 [of the Clean Air Act].
541 F.2d at 28 (footnote omitted), cited in NRDC v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318, 329 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (particulate standards for light duty diesel vehicles).
Often at issue was the crucial point as to whether or not the evidence was conclusive,
or in legal language, dispositive. The court in EDF v. EPA, 598 F.2d at 85 (quoting Ethyl
Corp., 541 F.2d at 37-38), argued concerning the assessment of health and biological
effects:
Contrary to the apparent suggestion of some of the petitioners, we need not seek
a single dispositive study that fully supports the Administrator's determination.
Science does not work that way; nor, for that matter, does adjudicatory fact-
finding. Rather, the Administrator's decision may be fully supportable if it is
based, as it is, on the inconclusive but suggestive results of numerous studies. By
its nature, scientific evidence is cumulative: the more supporting, albeit incon-
clusive, evidence available, the more likely the accuracy of the conclusion.
For an exchange on the implications of scientific disagreement, compare Green, The
Risk-Benefit Calculus in Safety Determinations, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 791 (1975) with
Handler, A Rebuttal: The Need for a Sufficient Scientific Base for Governmental Regu-
lation, 43 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 808 (1975). See also Gelpe & Tarlock, The Uses of Scien-
tific Information in Environmental Decision-Making, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 371 (1974);
Comment, Projected Environmental Harm: Judicial Acceptance of a Concept of Uncer-
tain Risk, 53 J. URa. L. 497 (1976).
28. See, e.g., EDF v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("We cannot accept the
proposition . . . that the Administrator's findings ... [are] insufficient because contro-
verted by respectable scientific authority. It [is] enough at this stage that the administra-
tive record contain respectable scientific authority supporting the Administrator."); see
also Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042
(1980): "The Administrator's decision is, of course, precisely the sort of issue that Con-
gress specifically left to his judgment, and where there is evidence in the record which
supports these judgments, this court is not at liberty to substitute its judgment for the
Administrator's." Id. at 1158. The court concluded:
[D]isagreement among the experts is inevitable when the issues involved are at
the "very frontiers of scientific knowledge," and such disagreement does not pre-
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The courts were also willing to give legitimacy to aesthetic val-
ues; though only newly recognized in public policy, they should
be allowed as much acceptance in the interplay of political
objectives and alternatives as developmental ones. Social change
had brought these values to the fore. Older institutions, and the
scientific and technical personnel associated with them, held
back. They had enormous difficulty in recognizing that such val-
ues had as much importance and legitimacy as their own, belit-
tled them, and sought to use political strategies to restrain them.
Courts on the whole took a different view. As judges observed
the wider social scene, it seemed clear to them that aesthetic
values were important to many in modern society; often the fact
that they personally shared those values contributed to their de-
cisions. From whatever quarter, however, the significance of
these changes in judicial doctrine rested on the ability of judges
to identify clearly and precisely vast and far-reaching social
changes that other governmental bodies often had difficulty em-
phasizing with equal sharpness and clarity. 9
Finally, courts grappled with new technologies and the rela-
tionship of environmental objectives to the pace of technological
change. When industrial litigants argued that environmental
regulation would be too burdensome, they sought to focus the
analysis on individual firms that would be adversely affected and
clude us from finding that the Administrator's decisions are adequately sup-
ported by the evidence in the record. It may be that LIA expects this court to
conclude that LIA's experts are right, and the experts whose testimony supports
the Administrator are wrong. If so, LIA has seriously misconceived our role as a
reviewing court. It is not our function to resolve disagreement among the experts
or to judge the merits of competing expert views.
Id. at 1160 (footnote omitted).
29. See McClelland, The Courts and the Conservation of Natural Beauty, W. WILD-
LANDS, Spring 1974, at 20; see also Leighty, Aesthetics as a Legal Basis for Environmen-
tal Control, 10 PuB. LAND & RESOURCES L. DIG. 54 (1973); Michelman, Toward a Practi-
cal Standard for Aesthetic Regulation, PRAC. LAW., Feb. 1969, at 36.
One of the earliest federal court affirmations of aesthetic values was in Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). Justice Douglas wrote for the majority:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it repre-
sents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within
the power of the Legislature to determine that the community should be beauti-
ful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully
patrolled.
Id. at 33 (citation omitted). State courts had made similar pronouncements. See, e.g.,
State v. Diamond Motors, 50 Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967). The Hawaii Supreme
Court stated, "We accept beauty as a proper community objective, attainable through
use of the police power." Id. at 36, 429 P.2d at 827. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), contains an extensive legal analysis of the use of police power
to protect aesthetic value under California law. Modjeska Sign Studios v. Berle, 55
A.D.2d 340, 390 N.Y.S.2d 945, rev'd, 43 N.Y.2d 468, 373 N.E.2d 255, 402 N.Y.S.2d 359
(1977), makes an analysis of the same subject from the vantage point of New York law.
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possibly forced to go out of business. Courts, however, tended to
emphasize the health of the industry as a whole rather than par-
ticular firms that might be obsolete. Was the industry capable of
moving ahead with new technologies, with greater efficiencies,
with greater benefit to society? 0
30. The federal courts outlined their affirmation of technology forcing in a series of
cases. For those dealing with air pollution from automobiles, see International Harvester
v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (extension of automobile standards);
NRDC v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (diesel exhaust standards). In the latter
case the court argued, "The legislative history of both the 1970 and the 1977 amend-
ments [to the Clean Air Act] demonstrates that Congress intended the agency to project
future advances in pollution control capability. It was 'expected to press for the develop-
ment and application of improved technology rather than be limited by that which exists
today.'" Id. at 328 (quoting S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1970)). The court
continued, "[The] EPA has concluded that it is absolutely necessary to issue standards
which motivate the private sector to maximize its efforts in reducing particulate emis-
sions from light-duty vehicles." Id. (quoting EPA, REGULATORY ANALYSIS OF THE LIGHT-
DUTY DIESEL PARTICULATE REGULATIONS FOR 1982 AND LATER MODEL YEAR LIGHT-DUTY
DIESEL VEHICLES 32 (1980)).
Similar problems were dealt with for stationary sources. The major issue was the in-
stallation of equipment to remove sulfur dioxide. See, e.g., Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427
U.S. 246 (1976): "These requirements . . . are expressly designed to force regulated
sources to develop pollution control devices that might at the time appear to be econom-
ically or technologically infeasible." Id. at 257. In Department of Environmental Re-
sources v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 490 Pa. 399, 416 A.2d 995 (1980), the court stated,
"This concept ... recognizes the ingenuity and innovativeness of American industry. If
the present 'state of the art' is such that it does not permit compliance, economic incen-
tive (i.e., a desire to stay in operation or avoid fines), provides the stimulus to produce
'private emission control innovation.'" Id. at 407, 416 A.2d at 999 (footnote omitted).
The most extensive application of the policy of technology forcing, however, came with
the technology-based standards of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984)), because of which the EPA had to choose models
of available technology-"technology which is available or normally can be made availa-
ble," S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1971)-which it would require industry to
install. "This does not mean that the technology must be in actual routine use some-
where." Id. at 51-52. The 1977 standards were to be the "average of the best existing
performance," id. at 50, and the 1983 standards "the best performer." Id. When industry
argued that the model was to be the "average of the industry's current performance,"
American Paper Inst. v. Train, 543 F.2d 328, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the court pointed out
that the record defined it in terms of the "average of the best existing performance." Id.
The EPA argued that the law required that the average of the top performers, usually
the top 10%, constitute the "exemplary plant" models and the court upheld its choice.
See Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1976); American
Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975).
The court rejected several efforts to limit the use of such "exemplary" models. The
paper industry, for example, argued that the strategy applied only to end-of-pipe treat-
ment and not to in-plant processes, but the court rejected that argument. American Pa-
per Inst., 543 F.2d at 343. It also rejected the argument that the EPA could not include
Canadian plants in selecting models. American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107,
132 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("Technology in the modern world knows few boundaries-the
United States-Canadian boundary perhaps least of all.").
Technology forcing also required the application of monitoring by industry. See Ken-
necott Copper Corp. v. New Mexico Envtl. Improvement Bd., 94 N.M. 610, 614 P.2d 22
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Courts accepted the environmental argument that cost-benefit
analysis should not be allowed to entrench older and more obso-
lete firms by emphasizing the cost of environmental regulation
to them, but that the more important question should be the
degree to which new and more modern production could move
ahead. They agreed that the implication of environmental laws
was to require some firms, usually the older and more obsolete
ones, to fall by the wayside to be replaced by more modern firms
that would enable the entire industry to progress.3"
In these instances-cases of new knowledge, new values, and
new technologies-environmentalists threw their weight on the
side of innovation. The environmental movement constituted a
major expression of demand for new research in science, accep-
tance of new social values, and technological change. It was one
among several elements in American society moving in those di-
rections. The response of the courts to the issues that arose from
these changes was to affirm their legitimacy and hence to give
them judicial approval. In this way, courts played a major role in
broad social decisionmaking, as well as in resolving more limited
disputes among litigants.
As time passed, however, this larger role of the courts began to
change from one of affirming new social values to one of granting
agencies considerable choice in implementing environmental
programs. As the agencies became more careful procedurally,
courts began to defer to their technical expertise. Judges did not
(Ct. App. 1980); Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979). With re-
spect to the latter case the court argued:
We discern from the statute a technology-forcing objective. Congress intended
that monitoring would impose a certain discipline on the use of modeling tech-
niques .... [It] projects that the employment of modeling techniques be held to
earth by a continual process of confirmation and reassessment, a process that
enhances confidence in modeling, as a means for realistic projection of air
quality.
Id. at 372.
For a general review of technology forcing, see Bonine, The Evolution of 'Technology-
Forcing' in the Clean Air Act, ENvTL. REP., July 1975, at 1. Several legal analyses of
technology forcing are La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Pro-
tection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771 (1977); Comment, Technology Forcing Under the
Clean Air Act: The Electric Utility Dilemma, 38 U. Pirr. L. REV. 505 (1977); and Com-
ment, Forcing Technology: The Clean Air Act Experience, 88 YALE L.J. 1713 (1979).
31. The courts distinguished the effect of regulation on individual firms from the ef-
fect on the health of an entire industry. See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Dono-
van, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (cotton dust litigation). The Court noted that "although [OSHA
found] some marginal employers may shut down rather than comply," the entire indus-
try was not threatened. Id. at 530-31 (quoting 43 Fed. Reg. 27,378 (1978)). The Court
approved the notion that "the practical question is whether the standard threatens the
competitive stability of an industry" and found that "in this case it does not." Id. at 530
n.55 (citing United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
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wish to tackle complex problems such as the choice of air quality
models, substantive judgments as to health and ecological ef-
fects, or choices among alternatives to planning. Despite the ob-
vious desire of litigants to wrest such from them, courts warned
about the limitations to their jurisdiction: "Although this in-
quiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate
standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered
to substitute its judgment for that of the agency."32 Agency
judgment was to be accepted if it constituted a "reasoned deci-
sion," a "rational conclusion based upon facts" rather than the
decisions that one party to a dispute preferred. As issues became
more technical in the course of policy implementation, judicial
deference became more extensive. 3
Environmentalists found it increasingly difficult to penetrate
this deference to shape the course of implementation. Agencies
sought to interpret their authority narrowly and to limit the in-
tensity of action on behalf of environmental goals. If their deci-
sions were "reasoned" according to judicial opinion, the courts
could not serve as an effective counterweight to administrative
lethargy on behalf of environmental goals. When administrative
choice moved in environmentalists' favor and the courts de-
ferred to it, environmentalists applauded the outcome; but the
opposite happened with greater frequency over the course of
32. EDF v. Corps of Eng'rs of the United States Army, 470 F.2d 289, 300 (8th Cir.
1972) (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971)), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973); see also EDF v. Hoffman, 421 F. Supp. 1083,
1089 (E.D. Ark. 1976), affd, 566 F.2d 1060 (8th Cir. 1977).
33. For similar statements of deference, see Connecticut Fund for the Env't, Inc. v.
EPA, 696 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1982) (sulfur content regulation changes); Lead Indus. Ass'n
v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir.) (health effects of lead), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042
(1980); Mision Indus. v. EPA, 547 F.2d 123 (1st Cir. 1976) (changes in Puerto Rico air
quality implementation plan); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 941 (1976); Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (prevention of
significant deterioration regulations).
A contrary view is expressed in R. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS (1983). Mel-
nick argues that federal courts have recently become more aggressive in their approach
to regulatory policy and less deferential to bureaucratic expertise. Melnick fails to place
judicial decisions in the context of legislative policy on the one hand and broader social
values and the evolution of scientific knowledge on the other. Many of his examples deal
with procedural rather than substantive matters. The most one can say is that courts
accepted major innovations in social choice as reflected in legislative decisions; to argue
that the courts imposed much of their own substantive views on decisionmaking has
little supporting evidence. Federal environmental court decisions in Environment Re-
porter-Cases reflect a persistent theme of deference to the technical expertise of the
agencies.
For a useful discussion of the role of the courts in relationship to administrative agen-
cies, see Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122
U. PA. L. REV. 509 (1974).
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time and rendered the courts less useful as a check on adminis-
trative action. If an agency argued that air quality models were
inadequate to determine the effect of sources of automobile pol-
lutants on ambient air to determine "significant deterioration"
or the transformation of sulfur dioxide into sulfates, the court
declined to question that judgment. If an environmental impact
statement was interdisciplinary and comprehensive, a satisfac-
tory "full disclosure" document, no matter what the substantive
agency choice among alternatives, it was acceptable.3 4
In sum, one might compare and contrast law and science in
the response of each to changing social values represented by
environmental affairs. Science reflects new realities and new cir-
cumstances for investigation, understanding, and perception of
those frontiers. Law, on the other hand, reflects new values and
choices made by individuals and institutions with respect to
changing circumstances. The relationship of science to society is
often indirect, mediated by those in scientific institutions who
make choices about what shall be investigated and how research
resources shall be deployed. The relationship of law to society,
on the other hand, is more direct; as individuals and institutions
feel that they are harmed by some new facet of social change,
they come into contention one with another, and bring their
complaints to courts.3 "
The environmental movement served greatly to expand the
realm of science, making far greater demands on existing scien-
tific and technical institutions than they were capable of meet-
34. In the early years of NEPA litigation, several writers observed the potential for
judicial supervision of substantive issues in the review of environmental impact state-
ments. See F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 258-65 (1973); Note, Substantive Review
Under the National Environmental Policy Act: EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 3 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 173 (1973). The authors suggested that the courts would be guided by the substan-
tive policy objectives in § 101 of the Act, the accuracy of cost-benefit analysis, and
"agency objectivity." Their examples were drawn from litigation condemning Corps of
Engineers environmental impact statements on river development projects which, to
them, indicated a tendency for the courts to argue that agency decisions could be re-
viewed on the merits as well as on procedure. See also Yarrington, Judicial Review of
Substantive Agency Decisions: A Second Generation of Cases Under the NEPA, 19
S.D.L. REv. 279 (1974).
Subsequent judicial decisions, however, did not indicate that courts were willing to
take up such questions. It is especially noteworthy that NEPA policy implications in
§ 101 played a minor role in both judicial and administrative decisions. See Caldwell,
NEPA's Unfulfilled Potential, ENVTL. F., Jan. 1985, at 38. Caldwell, one of the major
authors of the Act, wrote, "The substantive provisions of NEPA-its declared goals and
principles stated in Sections 101 and 204-have not been regarded by the courts as
[amenable] to judicial review and have therefore been discounted as effective law." Id. at
38, 40.
35. For a discussion of the relationship between science and law, see Markey, Science
and Law-Toward a Happier Marriage, 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 343 (1977).
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ing. But it also made demands upon law, which reflected social
values and social change more directly and hence was more re-
sponsive to environmental entreaties. Scientists tended to think
of themselves as relatively independent from social context, as
involved with a reality that was apart from people, their setting,
and their values. This led to scientists' detachment from the
public and their alignment with other scientific, technical, and
managerial institutions in their strategies for action and defense.
But courts forced scientists and technicians back into the
world of social reality to face their own particular, in contrast
with their assumed universal, values and the values of society.
Human aspirations and desires for achievement, even those of
scientific and technical specialists, as well as of society generally,
comprised the basis from which science, law, and government
developed during the Environmental Era. Courts sat amidst
changing human aspirations. And even though science and tech-
nology sought through management to perfect institutions that
would be divorced from the changing social reality, they could
not do so completely. Not only did courts respond more directly
to changing social values, but they had the ability to force other
institutions, especially those of science and technology, to do so
as well.
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